Complexity and Simplicity in Economics

# click the upper-left icon to select videos from the playlist

source: Simons Institute     2015年10月19日
Complexity and Simplicity in Economics  (Oct. 12 – Oct. 16, 2015)
The growth of the Internet over the past decades has enabled the advent of economic systems of previously unthinkable speed and complexity, generating enormous economic efficiencies. At the same time, these systems are so complex that it may be hard for humans or even computers to reason about them and make optimal economic decisions. Thus, economic systems and mechanisms need to be designed and analyzed from the combined perspectives of economic and computational efficiency. Ideal economic systems must still remain simple enough for human participants to understand, and must tackle hard problems that could not be solved perfectly even with all the currently available computing power. The goal of this workshop is to bring together researchers—from Computer Science, Economics, Game Theory and Operations Research, from academia and industry—to jointly study different notions of complexity and of simplicity in a variety of economic settings.
For more information, please visit https://simons.berkeley.edu/workshops/economics2015-1.
These presentations were supported in part by an award from the Simons Foundation.

The Emergent Structure of Simple Behaviors in Complex Networks 51:03 Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research New England / https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/nic...
Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings 33:01
Timing “Versus” Matching: Thickness and Information in Dynamic Markets 33:43
On Maximizing Revenue for Multi-Item Auctions 37:51
Simple Mechanisms for a (Sub)Additive Buyer 34:50
Algorithmic Bayesian Mechanism Design 34:31
The Substitution Metric and the Performance of Clock Auctions 49:05
Privacy, Substitutes, and Optimization in Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions 32:37
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms 33:06
Non-Revelation Mechanism Design: Inference, Optimization, and Approximation 45:13
Econometrics for Learning Agents 26:40
Smoothness and Pricing: Near-Optimal Outcomes in Markets Large and Small 47:25
Complexity in AGT Update: Nash Approximability and Simultaneous Auctions 35:06
Competition and Simple Auctions 32:40
Consensus Expectations and Conventions 48:00
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups 28:55
Decision Making at Scale: Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Platforms 36:31
First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue 46:13
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria 27:28
On the Borders of Border’s Theorem 34:36
Strong Duality for a Multiple Good Monopolist 32:17
Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Mechanism Design 31:37
Selling Experiments 47:41
The Sample Complexity of Revenue Maximization 35:00
How Well Do Prices Coordinate Markets 32:46
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination 34:17
Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation 35:22

No comments: