source: Israel Institute for Advanced Studies
1:35:55 Jason Hartline - Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and Approximation. Part II Jason Hartline (Northwestern University) - Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and Approximation. Part II, single - agent
mechanisms
1:31:34 Jason Hartline - Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and Approximation. Part I Jason Hartline (Northwestern University) - Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and Approximation. Part I, multi - agent
mechanisms
1:29:27 Tim Roughgarden - Communication Complexity and Impossibility Results for Simple Auctions Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University) - Communication Complexity and Impossibility Results for Simple Auctions
1:03:43 Stephen Morris - Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information Stephen Morris (Princeton University) - Arrow lecture:
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information
1:37:48 Kenneth Arrow Commemoration Event Kenneth Arrow Commemoration Event
1:31:36 Tim Roughgarden - The Price of Anarchy and Equilibrium Welfare Guarantees for Simple Auctions Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University) - The Price of Anarchy and Equilibrium Welfare Guarantees for Simple Auctions
1:29:50 Jakub Kastl - Empirical Analysis of Education Markets Jakub Kastl (Princeton University) - Empirical Analysis of Education Markets
1:30:26 Jakub Kastl - Empirical Analysis of Multiunit Auctions Jakub Kastl (Princeton University) - Empirical Analysis of Multiunit Auctions
1:33:03 Stephen Morris - Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, II Stephen Morris (Princeton University) - Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, II
1:30:43 Vasiliki Skerta - Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part B Vasiliki Skerta - Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part B
1:34:38 Sergiu Hart - Two(!) Good To Be True Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) - Two(!) Good To Be True
1:23:35 Stephen Morris - Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, Stephen Morris (Princeton University) - Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, I
1:31:08 Vasiliki Skerta - Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part A Vasiliki Skerta - Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part A
1:34:33 Ben Brooks - Information design meets mechanism design Ben Brooks (University of Chicago) - Information design meets mechanism design
1:30:29 Emir Kamenica - How to represent information Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago) - How to represent information
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